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THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY AND THE REBUILDING 
OF BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY*
Zachary Elkins
Nation-states, like their citizens, are dependent on their peers 
for cues about what passes for appropriate behavior. With 
respect to the evolution of political institutions, the result 
is the proliferation of political fads among certain clusters 
of countries, a process which scholars describe in terms 
of “waves”, “contagion”, “isomorphism”, and “refl ection”. 
The idea that the adoption of a practice by one actor would 
infl uence the probability of adoption by another (a useful 
defi nition of the concept diffusion1) is an intriguing meta-
subject of inquiry within a variety of disciplines and a variety 
1 This usage of “diffusion” is paraphrased from Strang’s (1991) defi nition as any 
“prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population [that] alters the probability 
of adoption for remaining non-adopters”. There are a host of related phenomena 
subsumed under this general concept (i.e., in addition to “waves”, “contagion”, 
“isomorphism”, and “refl ection”, we may include, “imitation”, “demonstration 
effects”, “mimicry”, “emulation”, “spatial autocorrelation”, “Galton’s Problem”, 
“dissemination”, “transfer”, and “signaling”).
*
 This article was adapted from a paper presented at the “Symposium on Brazi-
lian History and Society: Brasil/EUA – Novos Estudos Novos, Novos Diálogos”. 
CPDOC/Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, June 20 and 21, 2006.
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of topics2. In recent years, scholars of democracy – noting the 
symptoms of diffusion in their own phenomenon of interest 
– have produced an inspirational set of studies on the process 
(Starr, 1991; Markoff, 1996; O’Laughlin, Ward, et al., 1998; 
Coppedge and Brinks, 1999). These studies provide much 
needed confi rmation, and in some cases, elaboration, of a 
powerful mechanism of institutional change. 
At this point in the research cycle, we can be confi dent 
that institutional and policy transitions are highly 
contagious. The intent of the analysis below is to document 
the process of contagion at the level of the decision maker 
in transitioning countries. While the study is grounded in, 
and inspired by, evidence of contagion in democratization, we 
turn our attention away from the choice of regime type – 
a choice that is usually not debated publicly or concretely. 
Rather, the analysis below focuses on a very particular, but 
fundamental, institutional choice that confronts actors 
in new democracies: whether to adopt a presidential 
or parliamentary system of government. Anecdotal 
evidence and intuition suggests that this decision is highly 
dependent on the decisions of neighboring and otherwise 
relevant governments. I examine the decision process in 
Brazil, an important and recent case of democratization. 
This country is especially interesting because of its historical 
experience with both parliamentarism and presidentialism, 
the comprehensive agenda of its recent constitutional 
convention, and its strong ties to both the Americas and 
Europe – two important regions with opposing systems 
2  In political science, the work of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) on the diffusion 
of policy in the U.S. states prompted scholars to reconsider their assumptions 
about policy evolution. Since then, a number of studies of policy – e.g., Collier and 
Messick (1975) on social security and Tolbert and Zucker (1983) on civil service 
reform – and confl ict – e.g., Most and Starr (1980), Bremer (1992), Pollins (1989), 
Siverson and Starr (1991) – have confi rmed these insights. A parallel set of studies 
exists in sociology with respect to institutional evolution – e.g., Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Strang (1991).
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of government. The analysis below reviews evidence 
at both the cross-national level and the individual level that 
suggests that 1. foreign experience and foreign models 
are remarkably infl uential and relevant to the designers of 
policies in new democracies; 2. high-achieving countries 
as well as culturally similar countries make for infl uential 
models; and 3. institutional choice is highly path dependent 
and resistant to innovation.
The distribution of parliamentarism and presidentialism 
worldwide
Systems of government are highly segregated by culture, 
geography, and economic achievement. As the 1997 map in 
Figure 1 demonstrates vividly, regions of the world tend to 
be either parliamentarist or presidentialist but not both. 
The only regions with much diversity are Asia and 
Eastern Europe and even these are an overwhelming 70% 
presidentialist and parliamentarist, respectively. 
Figure 1:
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Of course, geography is strongly related to cultural 
characteristics like language, religion, and colonial heritage. 
In fact, Table 1 suggests that diversity within regions can be 
attributed to differences in colonial heritage, language, 
and religion. For example, while the Americas are largely 
presidentialist, the former British colonies in the region 
are universally parliamentarist with the exception of the 
United States. Similarly, Eastern Europe is predominately 
parliamentarist except for the states of the former Soviet 
Union, which are, to a country, presidentialist. Along with 
language and colonial heritage, religion makes for an 
excellent marker of cultural identity as well, and displays 
the same degree of institutional homogeneity. Observe, for 
example, the almost universal presidentialism among largely 
Muslim nations. However, all this is not to say that religion 
and blood are always thicker than geography. The former 
British possessions in Africa look like their presidential 
neighbors and not their former protector and patron. What 
seems clear, without turning to more formal multivariate 
analysis, is that systems of government are highly dependent 
on geography and several markers of culture. 
Parliamentarist and presidential governments differ 
markedly also by their economic resources and achievements. 
As Table 1 shows, parliamentary systems are, on average, 
signifi cantly more developed. Countries with parliamentary 
systems have a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, a higher degree of economic equality, a higher 
life expectancy, and a higher credit rating than do those 
with a presidential system. This discrepancy is even more 
pronounced if we exclude the United States. 
These profi les are not intended as historical evidence 
on the diffusion of different systems across the globe. 
Our interest at this point, however, is simply to document 
the currently highly clustered nature of systems of 
government in order to describe the unique setting in 
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Table 1: 
Characteristics of Presidential and Parliamentary Governments
Source: World Bank; Alvarez et al. 1999
Characteristic Parliamentary Systems Presidential Systems
Number of Countries in
Anglo America 9 1
Latin America 0 19
Africa 5 53
Asia 12 4
Eastern Europe 7 16
Western Europe 19 1
South Asia 4 4




Number of Countries which are former
Spanish colonies 1 20
British colonies 15 1
Average GDP per worker 19,301 13,769
Income Distribution (GINI) 42.9 35.6
Life Expectancy at Birth 71.6 65.8
Average Sovereign Bond Rating 
(S&P)
B C/D
N.B.  Over the entire sample, GINI ranges from 19.4 to 63.2, GDP from 480 to 
37,000, life expectancy from 33 to 73, and the S&P Bond ratings from A to G.
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which governments now operate. Nevertheless, it seems 
safe to assert that the distribution of systems results from 
a pattern of both imitation among peers and correlated, 
but independent, decisions by governments with similar 
histories and structural assets3. 
Five propositions about continuity and change in systems 
of government
What are the forces for, and against, institutional change 
in an environment in which the distribution of choices is 
highly clustered along cultural, economic, and geographic 
lines? Our intuition is that such an environment, in which 
there are clear policy signals from very cohesive reference 
groups, provides strong incentives to conform to group 
norms. The expectation is that these external infl uences are 
at least as strong as any domestic impulses and calculations 
for change. We begin with fi ve propositions.
Proposition 1: Governments will be reluctant to deviate 
from the practices of their cultural and geographic peers.
Why should neighbors and cultural peers be so 
infl uential? One reason is that similar or adjacent entities 
will interact more often. More contact and communication 
results in more shared information about practices. Axelrod 
(1997, p. 205) develops a model of the dissemination of 
culture that abstracts from this fundamental principle to 
say that communication is most effective between “similar” 
people. His theory of the diffusion of ideas specifi es 
mechanisms of change for local actors in the absence of 
any coordinating central authority. In his model, actors 
3 On the one hand, the coherence within cultural blocks is due in part by 
simultaneous, but independent, decisions on the part of countries with very 
similar structural characteristics. For example, it was natural for the former British 
colonies – all with experience with the parliamentary system – to adopt a similar 
system. In other cases (for example, the adoption of presidentialism in Latin 
America) there is clear evidence of actual imitation. 
263
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 88: 257-303, 2013
Zachary Elkins
are adaptive rather than fully rational: they follow simple 
rules about giving and receiving infl uence, but they do 
not necessarily calculate costs and benefi ts in a strategic, 
forward-looking way. The result of Axelrod’s model are 
pockets of ideational convergence, based on the number 
of features that two neighbors share in common. In the 
case of nation-states, increased information about foreign 
practices translates into imitation in a number of ways. 
For example, foreign models can encourage or expedite 
adoption by inserting a policy on a legislature’s agenda, 
by offering a ready-made answer to domestic pressure for 
“change” and “innovation”, by legitimating conclusions 
or predispositions already held, or by adding a decisive 
data point in the evaluation of alternatives (Bennett 
1991a, 1991b).
Increased communication among countries, however, 
is not the only motor behind social infl uence. Culturally 
similar entities, whether or not they communicate 
extensively, constitute a relevant reference group with 
an established code of behavior. As John Meyer and 
co-authors argue persuasively, nations and organizations 
are remarkably responsive to the need to conform to 
these norms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Rosenau (1990) 
terms these reference groups “cathectic”, suggesting that 
decision makers have a strong cultural sense of whom 
their nation should look like. In this sense, collectives 
may adopt institutions for symbolic or ceremonial 
reasons quite independent of effi ciency criteria (Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991). In the case of presidentialism and 
parliamentarism, in which the institutions are highly 
clustered along cultural and geographic lines, the 
expectation is that the mechanisms of communication 
and conformity will be especially strong. 
Proposition 2: Governments will be attracted to the 
policies of more economically successful governments.
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One of the basic tenets of social infl uence is that 
actors of lower social status emulate those of higher 
status. Policy makers might emulate the policies of 
successful, high achieving nations under the assumption 
that these nations possess some degree of expertise or 
even that their enhanced performance is in part due 
to their superior institutions. Westney (1987) makes 
this argument in her description of Japan’s adoption 
of police, postal, and newspaper institutions from 
the West in the 1800’s. In diffusion research, such 
transfers fall under the concept of hierarchical diffusion 
(see Lerner, 1964; Collier and Messick, 1975; Rogers, 
1995). Since a strict class distinction between 
presidentialists and parliamentarists makes it very clear 
what the status structure will be, we expect the forces of 
hierarchical diffusion to be strong.
Proposition 3: Among developing nations, there will be 
some resistance towards the policies of a hegemonic or 
imperial power. 
The proposition adds an important qualifier to 
proposition 2. Anti-imperialism is a strong feeling in 
developing nations and political policies have very symbolic 
power. While successful nations can serve as natural 
showcases with alluring models, success can breed as much 
resentment as it can admiration. 
Proposition 4: Young states are more susceptible to 
external infl uences, and thus policy transition, than are 
older states. 
Proposition 5: A government’s institutional choice is 
dependent largely upon the generation of its birth. 
These two propositions stem from the premise that 
institutional choices are extremely path dependent 
and, once adopted, hard to amend. A generation or 
two in a continued policy state can build in citizens a 
strong symbolic, and in the case of leaders, professional 
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attachment, to their institution. This is a common 
observation in the literature on the diffusion of innovations 
and bears examination in the case of political institutions. 
The crucial insight here is that a symbolic attachment to 
institutions can thwart a transition to what experts may 
agree are superior, or at least more appropriate, institutions. 
The QWERTY typewriter and non-Metric systems are 
two examples of inferior practices that continue largely 
due to real or perceived costs of transition. This insight 
leads us to two interesting expectations for political 
institutions. First, it is fair to assume that in young states 
the accumulated attachment to institutions is low, and so the 
costs of removing existing structures and practices is 
similarly low. It is, therefore, these young, embryonic 
states that should be most sensitive to the infl uence of 
their cultural, geographic, and economic peers. Second, 
and consequently, we suggest that the evolution of a 
government’s system of government is highly dependent 
on the prevailing wisdom during the era of its birth. As 
such, we should see distinct “generational” differences 
among governments with respect to parliamentarism and 
presidentialism, according the government’s date of birth. 
In this paper, we merely note these propositions; our 
evidence focuses on the fi rst three. 
Baseline Domestic Political Predictors of Institutional 
Transition
While we are most interested in external infl uences on a 
government’s choice of institution, we must also consider 
internal forces unrelated to a government’s international 
and generational environment. The assumption behind 
such explanations is that decision makers are largely 
unaffected by the infl uence of their peers. When crises 
arise that precipitate a reconsideration of their policies and 
institutions, they either look to the experience of their own 
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nation or act purely from their own preferences and needs. 
Their own preferences and needs have to do mainly with 
the structure of their other political institutions. 
There are at least three plausible structural reasons 
for leaders to support one system over the other. First, 
parliamentarism thrives in nation states that have strong 
and unifi ed national parties. Which characteristic leads 
to the other is unclear, although it is probable that the 
installation of parliamentarism leads to these strong parties. 
It is also plausible that governments characterized by weak 
parties will view presidentialism as a better fi t than they 
will parliamentarism. Second is the related fi nding that 
very few large federal states have parliamentarism. While 
parliamentarism is certainly possible in a federal state 
(e.g., Germany), it is seems reasonable to think that 
diversity and decentralization in such states makes it 
diffi cult to build the strong and unifi ed national parties 
that parliamentarism requires. Third, the decision process 
of some leaders will undoubtedly include an estimate of 
the probability that either system will advance their 
professional interests. Presumably, they would be in favor 
of whichever system would be most amenable to electing, 
as national executive, themselves or their preferred 
candidate (or, conversely, avoiding the election of their 
least preferred candidate). These domestic factors serve as 
benchmark explanations by which we judge the strength 
of the external infl uences.
Rates of transition between systems
The literature proliferating in the last decade on the 
merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism has 
a prescriptive fl avor that implies reasonable odds of 
transition between systems (Linz, 1990, 1994; Stepan 
and Skach, 1993; Riggs, 1997). The reality is that such 
transitions are rare. In fact, the records of one leading 
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dataset (Alvarez et al., 1999) do not contain a single case 
of transition between the two systems between 1950 and 
1990 (the time period covered by the data)4. To some 
degree, such continuity is a methodological artifact of the 
Alvarez et al. (1999), which do not differentiate between 
parliamentary and presidential systems in cases that they 
deem non-democratic (a category which includes 60% of 
the cases in the sample).
Notwithstanding the Alvarez et al. (1999) coding 
decision, system-of-government transitions are a rare 
event. A useful World Bank dataset, which covers the 
period 1975 to 1987 and excludes far fewer non-
democracies (14.7% are coded non-democracies), shows 
roughly one or two transitions a year in each direction. 
Table 2 reports these transition probabilities for shifts 
in each direction and identifi es the cases of transition. 
Note that these rates should be considered an upper limit 
since some transitions, like that of Spain and Portugal to 
parliamentarism, might be better understood as transitions 
from authoritarianism than from presidential democracy. 
Nevertheless, transitions in either direction (the rates of 
which are less than 2%), are a rare event by most standards. 
For comparison, they are similar to those for transitions to 
democracy, which in the last fi fty years average a little less 
than 2%, and about half the rates of transitions to liberal 
economic policies which tend to occur about 4 to 5 % of 
the time (Simmons and Elkins, 2003)5.
4 See Alvarez (1998) for an interesting application of these data to questions of 
parliamentarism and presidentialism.
5 These democracy transition rates are around 2% regardless of whether one 
thinks of transitions as major changes in the level of democracy – and so uses a 
graded scale of democracy – or as shifts in democracy over and above a certain 
cut point – and uses a dichotomous measure like that of Alvarez et al. (1999). 
Normally this is a critical methodological distinction (Elkins, 2000).
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Table 2: 









1978 Spain Grenada, Pakistan
1979 Panama
1980 Thailand Zimbabwe
1981 Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nepal Suriname, Turkey
1982 Honduras Djibouti







1990 Sudan, Honduras, Suriname
1991 Germany Zimbabwe
1992 Bangladesh, Suriname, Togo Cape Verde
1993 Fiji, Niger




Number of Countries 
ever at Risk
108 73
Time at Risk 1880 1076
Number of Transitions 22 21
Transition Rate (%) 1.17 1.95
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Parliamentarism and presidentialism in Brazil
Given the rarity of these transitions, there is much to be 
gained by looking carefully at the decision process in a par-
ticular case where such a transition is under consideration. 
Brazil makes for an intriguing case study for several rea-
sons. The country is unique in the Americas in that it has 
extensive experience with both presidentialism and parlia-
mentarism. Immediately following independence from Por-
tugal, Brazil existed with a semi-parliamentary system until 
the deposition of emperor Dom Pedro II in 18896. At that 
point, Brazil gravitated to a presidential republic fashioned 
after the United States version7. Throughout the century, 
6 Brazilian independence, itself, was a unique affair. Dom Pedro I, the son of the 
Portuguese king, residing in Rio de Janeiro, himself declared Brazil’s independen-
ce. This irony was the result of the king’s having left Lisbon for Rio in order to 
seek refuge from Napoleon, and then – comfortably ensconced in Rio and fi nding 
it more and more diffi cult to rule Portugal remotely – cutting ties with Lisbon. 
With respect to the system of government, this had unique consequences for Bra-
zil. In order to accommodate a royal head of state, but still adopt a more represen-
tative system – as the powerful ideas from the American and French revolutions 
demanded – Brazil adopted a semi-parliamentary system. 
7 A stable parliamentary system continued in Brazil until Dom Pedro II’s deposition 
in 1889. With the end of the empire, leaders convened a constitutional assembly to 
devise a new set of rules. From the results of the 1891 Constitutional Assembly, it is 
clear that the young United States served as the principal model for Rui Barbosa 
and other founders of the Brazilian republic. The founders commissioned three 
authors who, working independently, were to draft initial versions from which to 
craft the fi nal document. Not only did all three produce a presidential plan, but 
also all three employed language from the US constitution to do so. Compare 
Americo Brasiliense’s version “The exercise of executive power of the federation 
will be conferred on a single person who will have the title of President of the 
United States of Brazil; his mandate will be for four years” (Franco and Pilla, 1958) 
with the United States version “The executive power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America. He shall hold his offi ce for the term of four 
years” (Article II, Section I of the US Constitution). Even the new name of the 
federation, United States of Brazil, was no accidental reference to the northern 
US. The adoption process was as clear as could be. Upon receiving the “new” 
constitution, one delegate wrote to a friend, “we all knew that it was not an original 
work or any sort political experimentation. [The three drafters] presented us with 
the text of the North American constitution, completed with a few lines from the 
Swiss and Argentine documents” (Amaro Cavalcanti apud Franco and Pilla, 1958). 
The turn away from Europe, or more exactly, towards the United States had been 
a number of years in the making. Clearly, the young United States model had 
270
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 88: 257-303, 2013
The weight of history and the rebuilding of Brazilian democracy
however, parliamentarism has had adherents who have pre-
sented periodic proposals for its reinstatement8. Brazilian 
leaders even reverted to parliamentarism for one brief stint, 
in 1961, during a time of crisis9. 
Brazil is an interesting case also because of its close 
ties to both the United States and Europe – the world’s two 
principal models of presidentialism and parliamentarism 
respectively. Economically, Brazil depends upon the United 
States for most of its trade and external capital. Politically 
and culturally, however, Brazilians are very cognizant of 
their European roots and often prefer European products 
much to recommend it. Intellectually, it represented a fresh, progressive answer 
for other countries in the hemisphere that did not yet have reason to resent 
North American power and infl uence. To many it was still an irreverent answer to 
centuries of European domination on the continent. More importantly, it was the 
model adopted by each and every one of the newly independent Latin American 
states. It was clear that Brazil was conscious of not fi tting in with its neighbors. As 
early as the middle of the century, Alberdi and others were attempting to steer the 
direction of Brazilian politics towards that of its neighbors, including the United 
States. In 1852, Alberdi complained bitterly, “nothing is more outdated and false 
than the pretended antagonism between the political views between Brazil and the 
other South American republics [...] Brazil is today a power essentially American” 
(Franco and Pilla, 1958, p. 25).
8 These calls came from important political fi gures. Even Rui Barbosa, one of those 
credited with founding a presidential Brazil, very famously became disenchanted 
with his creation and joined the call for parliamentarism. Nevertheless, despite 
legislative proposals that were presented every ten or fi fteen years (the strongest 
of them was Raul Pilla’s amendment in 1946), a presidentialist majority (often 
enforced and fi nanced by clearly defi ant presidents) always prevailed. 
9 Parliamentarism reentered Brazilian politics by political necessity in 1961 for 
about 18 months. That year, vice president João Goulart, the left successor of a 
right administration, assumed the presidency after frustrated President Jânio 
Quadros stepped down. The military and the right found Goulart’s accession 
unacceptable and began preparations for his removal. To prevent a coup, leaders 
from the left and right reached a compromise in which Goulart would continue as 
president in a parliamentary system. Stripped of nearly all power, Goulart began 
almost immediately to press for the return of presidentialism. After 18 months of 
economic and political confusion, he was able to sow enough doubt in the system 
that the legislature organized a national plebiscite on the question. The Brazilian 
mass public, as they have in subsequent surveys and in a similar plebiscite 30 years 
later, voted overwhelmingly for presidentialism (nearly fi ve to one). After the re-
installation of presidentialism (and with it the restoration of Goulart’s power), the 
inevitable military coup occurred to remove Goulart, thus beginning twenty years 
of uninterrupted military leadership in the guise of a presidentialist democracy.
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and styles. The result is an interesting tension between each 
of these infl uences. 
Another reason to focus on constitutional decisions 
in Brazil is that its Constitutional Assembly in 1987-1988 
and the parliamentarism-presidentialism debate within 
the assembly marked a critical moment in the country’s 
transition to democracy. Unlike the rather perfunctory 
constitutional process of some of its transitioning neighbors 
(e.g., Argentina), Brazil’s process was open to more 
fundamental and comprehensive change in the structure 
of government. Such a deliberate, thorough process 
presents a good opportunity to understand how decision 
makers incorporate foreign models when designing new 
political institutions. Moreover, debate over the system of 
government was easily the most important and fundamental 
issue facing the delegates at the constitution. The subject 
occupied a disproportionate amount of their time, inspired 
over sixty books and countless articles, and its vote was the 
only session that all 559 delegates attended. Indeed, for 
some, the very reason for commissioning a new constitution 
at all was to rethink presidentialism. Remember that 
the military government had operated within a formally 
democratic constitution (albeit modifi ed to suit their needs 
in 1969). Many Brazilian politicians – at least presidentialists 
like Marco Maciel – argued that a new constitution 
was unnecessary for the transition to democratic rule. 
The odds on presidentialism and parliamentarism in the 
Constitutional Assembly
From the day the Constitutional Assembly convened, the 
adoption of a parliamentary system seemed inevitable. 
There are four strong reasons to have expected such a 
choice. First, a large majority of elites within Brazil had 
converged on a preference for parliamentarism by the time 
the convention opened. Intellectuals, for one, were (and still 
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are) overwhelmingly in favor. Virtually all of the opinion pieces 
in the media and books on the subject are unequivocally 
supportive of parliamentarism10. José Serra, in fact, claims 
in his paean to parliamentarism that he can count on 
one hand the intellectuals who support presidentialism. 
Moreover, this group of pro-parliamentarist intellectuals was 
well represented at the convention. Surveys of delegates11 
consistently showed that more than 70% of the delegates 
favored parliamentarism throughout the convention. Even 
more importantly, the chair and rapporteurs of the relevant 
committees (that is, the committee and its subcommittee 
responsible for drafting the proposal and the integration 
committee responsible for incorporating additions and 
changes introduced by delegates in the general assembly) 
were staunch parliamentarists. 
Second, to the extent that policy makers had formally 
evaluated the merits of the two systems, the results had 
come back strongly in favor of parliamentarism. The most 
important of these studies was one carried out in 1985 
by a fi fty-member commission headed by Afonso Arinos. 
The commission, staffed largely by academics (including 
Bolivar Lamournier and Helio Jaguaribe), recommended 
a mixed parliamentary system like that of France. Fourth, 
the political and economic context of the 1980’s seemed 
to predispose legislators to parliamentarism. After twenty 
years of military rule, marked by egregious displays of 
executive dominance, the stage was set for a substantial 
shift in power towards the legislature. Parliamentarism, 
many argued, was exactly the right vehicle to accomplish 
this delicate rebalancing. Moreover, and most importantly, 
parliamentarism offered an excellent solution to the 
problem of Executive transition during crises that had 
10 The 1993 plebiscite provided the opportunity for academics and political 
thinkers to produce a wealth of propaganda.
11 Like that in Veja newsmagazine on February 2, 1987.
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seemed to plague Brazil and its neighbors. Many Brazilian 
elites had lamented the infl exibility of presidentialism 
and its unresponsiveness to changes in the political mood. 
Nelson Jobim, in a critique of presidentialism, quipped that 
the system had only three responses to crisis: 1. suicide in 
1954; 2. renouncement in 1961, and 3. coup d’etat in 1964 
(apud Pereira, 1993)12. Parliamentarism, of course, offers a 
convenient and legitimate way to remove an unpopular or 
ineffective Executive. 
Such convenience and fl exibility seemed particularly 
salient during the drafting of the Constitution. Many 
legislators were unhappy with José Sarney’s succession 
after Tancredo Neves’ sudden infi rmity and then death 
in 1985. One year later, when the convention opened, 
they were certainly amenable to a mechanism that 
would remove him. This discontent with Sarney was only 
exacerbated by hyperinfl ation and Sarney’s apparent 
inability to resolve it. Moreover, anti-Sarney leaders 
were not the only ones attracted to parliamentarism 
as a mechanism for executive removal. So too were forces 
on the right who feared a successful presidential run by 
Lula or even Leonel Brizola. In short, parliamentarism 
seemed to be a good fi t at this time. 
So how did Brazil wind up with presidentialism? The 
use of eleventh-hour carrots and sticks by a still-powerful 
and very presidentialist president seemed to carry the day. 
A parliamentary constitution sailed through the three 
committees only to be scuttled by a vigorous campaign 
by Sarney, who doled out an estimated 100 million 
dollars in pork in order to insure support (Fleischer, 
1990). With the full assembly present – including many 
delegates who had largely stopped attending the plenary 
12 Jobim was referring to 1. president Getúlio Vargas’ suicide; 2. the compromise 
decision to adopt parliamentarism in 1961, and 3. the military coup.
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sessions – presidentialism won with 60 percent of the 
vote. Parliamentarists were reportedly shocked at the 
turn of events but, with the convention coming to a close, 
were not able to overturn the decision. They managed to 
salvage some hope by incorporating the question into an 
already scheduled plebiscite in 1993 on the question of 
monarchy v. republic. An appeal to the mass public was 
almost certainly in vain. Throughout the century, Brazilian 
citizens have consistently supported presidentialism when 
polled or asked to vote. Sure enough, 1993 proved to be 
no exception as presidentialism was confi rmed by a margin 
of three to one. 
Evidence of diffusion in the Constitutional Assembly
To what degree and in what way did the practices and 
experiences of other governments matter to the delegates? 
We look for an answer in three sources of evidence: 1. what 
delegates say in an interview; 2. what they argued during 
the Constitutional Assembly; and fi nally 3. how they voted. 
Together these three sources suggest the strong infl uence 
of foreign models. 
Deliberations within the Constitutional Assembly
The best, and most illustrative, way to understand the way 
leaders make use of foreign experience is to read the text 
of the lengthy debate in the Constitutional Assembly. Of 
course, this gives us access only to the public discussion 
of the issue, and no insight into backroom deals and 
bargaining – a decisive arena in any political (including 
constitutional) issue. Nevertheless, with respect to the 
system of government question in Brazil, we are blessed 
with an extraordinary amount of public discussion on the 
issue. From the day of the fi rst plenary session, February 14 
of 1987, up until only days before the fi nal draft was issued, 
September 5 of 1988, delegates debated parliamentarism 
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and presidentialism. This discussion occurred in essentially 
three settings: the plenary sessions, the committee on the 
division of the three powers, and the powerful integration 
committee (the group responsible for incorporating 
the suggestions of the various committees into a draft of the 
constitution). 
In the plenary session alone, there were over 350 
speeches delivered on the subject. Given the vast agenda 
in front of the delegates, this represents a monumentally 
disproportionate degree of attention to this issue. Indeed, an 
unscientifi c comparison of my stack of photocopied system-
of-government speeches with the 15 thousand or so pages of 
plenary session transcripts, suggests that the delegates spent 
at least 15% of their time discussing the issue. 
I have collected information on 339 of these speeches. 
While I suspect that the universe of speeches is greater than 
350 (but less than 400), my sample is restricted to those 
speeches that I was able to locate and identify as having to 
do primarily with the system of government. I disregard 
speeches that address the question only peripherally, as 
well as those which address merely mechanical issues of the 
debate such as vote calls and points of order. 
Furthermore, I have sampled 80 of the 100+ speeches 
on the question delivered in the three Powers committee. 
As we may expect, the nature of these speeches, compared 
with those in the plenary session, are on the whole more 
refi ned and more substantive. These meetings convened 
experts (political scientists and constitutional lawyers) and 
commissioned a surprising amount of data and historical 
records on comparative systems of government. 
Not surprisingly, given the parliamentarist leanings of 
most of the delegates, parliamentary speeches outnumber 
presidentialist speeches by a 2 to 1 margin in the plenary 
session (62% are parliamentarist, 32% are presidentialist, and 
6% are unclear) and by a 9 to 1 margin in committee. This 
276
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 88: 257-303, 2013
The weight of history and the rebuilding of Brazilian democracy
refl ects the overwhelming preference for parliamentarism 
among those active and verbal during the assembly. 
Salience of foreign experience to the delegates
So how relevant was foreign experience to the delegates? 
Of the 339 speeches in our sample, 151 (44.5%) appealed 
to foreign evidence in some way to make their argument 
(Table 3). If we consider the 80 speeches in the three Powers 
committee, the proportion of international arguments is 
even higher (67%), suggesting outside information was 
even more relevant to those deeply involved in the issue, 
and perhaps, given the committees parliamentary leanings, 
to those preferring parliamentarism. 
Table 3: 
Attributes and Arguments in System of Government Speeches
























151 45% 100% 44% 42%
Speeches which mention countries in
Europe 87 26% 54% 43% 21%
The United States 53 16% 33% 26% 51%
Latin America 26 8% 16% 7% 18%
Speeches which argue 
Parliamentarism 
is more modern
121 36% 64% 62% 1%
Anti-imperialism 34 10% 21% 16% 2%
Brazil is most like 
Europe
41 12% 25% 20% 0%
US Exceptionalism 13 4% 85% 7% 0%
Change is too 
risky
23 7% 16% 1% 21%
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In a speech rather early on in the convention, on April 
23 of 1987, Atila Lira anticipated the parade of foreign 
examples that would come before the delegates: “Much we 
will drink – we delegates – of the fountain of experience and 
wisdom of foreign politics, and from there take advantage 
of a valuable contribution – making, of course, adaptations 
which better conform with our cultural formation”. 
Given that most wealthy, high performing democracies 
are parliamentary governments, one might expect that the 
parliamentarists would employ more foreign references 
than would the presidentialists. Surprisingly, this was not the 
case. A roughly equal proportion of parliamentarists and 
presidentialists (44% and 42% respectively) cited foreign 
evidence in their arguments (Table 3). Upon analysis, 
however, it becomes clear that a signifi cant number of 
presidentialist examples are merely responses to the foreign 
references cited by parliamentarists. 
It would not be right to imply that the international 
arguments dominated the debate. It is more accurate to 
say that the delegates used a pluralistic approach, using 
whatever evidence and logic at their disposal. Many 
speeches (35%) drew directly on the Brazilian experience 
with presidentialism and parliamentarism – a very 
understandable approach given country’s long trials with 
the two systems in the last two centuries. 
In fact, there was some noticeable resistance to the idea 
of importing practices from foreign soil: 
We absolutely do not want simply the transplanting of a 
constitutional model from another nation. What we want is 
a system of government suited to our political, economic, 
and social formation – one appropriate to the institutional 
reality of Brazil13.  
13 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Érico Pegoraro on April 9, 1987. 
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I think that it matters little the name that we give the system 
of our government – whether it be neo-parliamentarist or 
neo-presidentialist. What matters is that we do not recreate 
the crazy experiences copied from foreign models14.  
Presidentialism, then, satisfi es a national aspiration. It 
was not the fruit of ignorance but a conscious choice of 
this nation [...] Our case, cannot be one in which we copy 
foreign experiences15. 
By way of introduction, it is also worth remarking 
upon the level of sophistication at which the debate was 
conducted. Both sides of the debate, but especially the 
parliamentarists, were well versed in the substantive and 
theoretical evolution and implications of each system of 
government. The heavy hand of the social scientist was 
visible throughout the debate. Delegates were not shy about 
introducing the ideas of Duverger, Linz, or Sartori in the 
plenary session, as if these authors were required reading. 
Evidence of hierarchical emulation (proposition 2)
On a very basic level, proponents of parliamentarism in the 
Constitutional Assembly made sure that delegates knew of 
the correlation between modern, advanced societies and 
parliamentarism. Of the 201 parliamentarist speeches, 
121 (62%) made this argument. Some would just cite the 
relationship; others would extend the logic to suggest that 
parliamentarism is the more evolved, modern practice. 
Delegates seem to sprinkle in this connection so frequently 
that it became a stylized fact during the convention that 
parliamentarism was the more “modern” system. Consider 
a few examples: 
14 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Mário Assad on June 3, 1987.
15 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Prisco Viana on August, 1987.
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[...] [parliamentarism] is preferred by the civilized societies 
of the world today16;  
We know that the greatest countries of the world, with a 
democratic tradition, with the accumulated wisdom of 
centuries – as is the case in Italy, France, and England – have 
adopted the parliamentary system17;  
I support the implantation of the parliamentarist regime 
since it is molded in the experience and tradition of the 
countries with a highly civilized nature18; 
The total structure of the presidential system is in the 
process of bankruptcy. As such, the great majority of 
developed nations, with the exception of the United States 
and Finland, have already adopted the parliamentary form 
of government19;  
We want to decentralize power, create an effective 
legislature, and modernize the country’s political 
institutions – parliamentarism is the only way to do this20; 
Presidentialism is the political portrait of frustrated and 
backward democracy the world over21; 
It has become clear that the parliamentarist majority in 
this body will succeed in creating a modern system of 
government for Brazil22; 
In truth, Mr. President, fellow delegates, we need a modern 
system like parliamentarism [...]23. 
The connection between parliamentarism and 
modernity was useful in several ways to the parliamentarists. 
16 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Oswaldo Lima Filho on April 4, 1987.
17 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Joaquim Bevilacqua on April 15, 1987.
18 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Jorge Arbage on on July 3, 1987.
19 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Agassiz Almeida on August 20, 1987.
20 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Eduardo Bonfi m on July 24, 1987.
21 Excerpt from an article by Carlos Castello Branco, as cited by the Victor Faccioni 
on August 15, 1987.
22 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Nilson Sguarezi on September 24, 1987.
23 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Érico Pegoraro on April 9, 1987.
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It enabled them to suggest that the system was a product of 
more developed societies, implying that the choice of the rich 
and successful must be superior. Societies that have produced 
such greatness, they reasoned, would surely have the best 
political institutions. However, some would extend the 
argument even further to suggest that parliamentarism was 
in part responsible for the development and success of not 
only their democracy, but also a host of other achievements. 
For example: 
[...] we have perceived, with clarity, that the ideal system of 
government – for all the countries that want to overcome 
underdevelopment – is parliamentarism24; 
On the other hand, nations consumed by the war – such 
as Germany, France, Italy, and Japan – fortifi ed and were 
reborn under the parliamentary system, and transformed 
into world powers of greatness, in economic, cultural, and 
political terms25; 
After the Second World War, parliamentarism was installed 
in Italy, Germany, France, Portugal, Greece – practically in 
all of Western Europe. If we look at those countries, 
we note that there is liberty, union life, participation of 
various parties, distribution of wealth, and an evolved and 
developed society26. 
Of course, there were those on the presidential side 
who questioned such hopeful theses: 
Without a doubt, we will not increase popular participation 
and democracy by turning on our heels and imitating 
advanced industrial Europe or Japan27; 
24 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Sergio Spada on March 22, 1988.
25 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Joaquim Bevilacqua on April 15, 1987.
26 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Egídio Ferreira Lima on March 2, 1988.
27 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Florestan Fernandes on November 11, 1987.
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Germany and France are cited as developed countries 
of the industrialized world [...] in order to suggest that 
parliamentarism is superior to presidentialism. It is a 
matter of being part of the industrialized world. All with an 
elevated cultural level, free of illiteracy and with a standard 
of living two or three times that of Brazil. Their reasoning 
is the same as if we were to cite the United States to say that 
presidentialism was superior to parliamentarism28. 
Evidence for the infl uence of cultural peers (proposition 1)
Clearly, one of the stronger arguments of the 
parliamentarists is the prevalence of their system among the 
more advanced and developed nations. However, as some 
of the examples above suggest, much of this argumentation 
is more cultural than it is economic, with their authors 
implying that European practices are more appropriate 
for Brazil than are North American practices. In fact, 41 
speeches included this argument. For example, 
With the proclamation of the Republic we looked, 
incorrectly, to the United States, a model of presidentialist 
government. Our cultural roots are European, and not of 
North American origin. Why, therefore, import an alien 
system, strange to our traditions, if we already had, here our 
own model, originated from Europe, adapted and perfected 
through successive administrations during the [Brazilian] 
empire?29; 
Why not follow, in a serious and defi nite manner, the 
example of countries like ours [...] most recently, a country 
that has the same origins as us, Spain, a country which 
adopted a parliamentary system of the classic form [...]30; 
28 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Arnaldo Martins on May 20, 1987.
29 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Victor Faccioni on March 27, 1987.
30 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Cunha Bueno on August 6, 1987.
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It was parliamentarism in Portugal which dislodged the 
military from the political process. That is our example!31 .
References to the Americas (propositions 1 and 3)
There were essentially three ways for the parliamentarists 
to reconcile the supposed success of United States 
presidentialism. One was to dismiss the United States entirely 
as an imperialist power not worthy of admiration and 
emulation. A full 16% of parliamentarist speeches included 
such reasoning. Often these arguments mixed an affi nity 
for Europe with an antipathy to the United States and the 
institutions it had inspired in the Americas.
[…] it has to be understood that this country needs a system 
of government – and this system must be new, modern. 
It can’t be a system, for example, from Mexico or from 
the United States where they resolve crises by means of a 
revolver [...] No, no it will not be Texas which inspires us 
but instead the example of old Europe32; 
[...] this institution [presidentialism] will represent yet 
another pact with the North American devil33; 
[…] imperialism is practiced with much more intensity 
in presidentialist regimes, perhaps in its most gross 
form, perhaps the most civilized form of United States 
domination34.
A second method, however, was to suggest the 
uniqueness of the United States and, accordingly, its 
incomparability with the Brazilian system (and that of Latin 
America more generally). 
31 Excerpt from a speech delivered by José Fogaça on July 8, 1987.
32 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Walmor de Luca on July 17, 1987.
33 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Victor Faccioni on July 30, 1987.
34 Excerpt from a speech delivered by José Fogaça on August 8, 1987.
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In the Brazilian presidentialism, badly copied from North 
America, we see the centralization, the authoritarianism, 
the paternalism, the infl exibility, and the rigidity of the 
Brazilian system are accentuated and perpetuate the 
worst of our national politics, which we need to eliminate 
defi nitively in order to create a viable democracy and 
institutional stability35. 
Already I am very certain that the potential virtues of the 
North American presidential system are virtues only [in the 
United States]36. 
We do not have the characteristics of North American 
society, whose force of infl uence and participation controls 
the power of government37. 
[…] we adopted presidentialism [...] in an almost literal 
imitation of the North American system, without attention 
to our economic, social, and ethnic conditions which do not 
compare with those of the United States38. 
A third, and related, argument employed by the 
parliamentarists was to suggest that presidentialism 
practiced in Latin America is of inevitably a weaker – almost 
unworkable – variety. Those who advanced this argument, 
would imply that the adoption of presidentialism in Latin 
America incorporated the negative, more autocratic, 
tendencies of the system. In essence, another suggestion that 
Brazil is not well suited to such a system for it exacerbates 
the Latin American predilection towards authoritarianism. 
“In addition, the presidentialism which spread through 
Latin America is an artifi cial and poor imitation of the 
American model. It is not built to last”39. 
35 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Victor Faccioni on April 9, 1987.
36 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Nelson Aguiar on August 5, 1987
37 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Adhemar de Barros Filho on April 9, 1987
38 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Enrico Pegorano on April 9, 1987.
39 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Egídio Ferreira Lima on September 3, 1987.
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Interestingly, Latin America – and its tradition of 
presidentialism – is used only as a negative example. 
Even the presidentialists do not invoke the tradition of its 
neighbors to support their choice of regime. 
The last twenty years of military government shows the true 
face of presidentialism, translating what is really the typical 
caudilhismo of South America, in which a leader castrates the 
genuine path of nationality40. 
I am convinced that the presidentialist regime, in its heart, 
stimulates only those who nurture tyrannical and caudilhista 
purposes. In Europe, presidentialism no longer exists, and 
here in Latin America it feeds the determination of leaders 
of groups which have throughout the years, perpetually 
been in power41. 
The presidentialists, likewise, did not use the United 
States as a model to any great extent. Presidentialists on 
the left understandably did not want to connect their 
institutional choice to the US. The right was much less 
vocal, but when pressed, would usually support their 
statements with evidence from Brazil. For the most 
part, their references were mostly reactive, trying to 
disabuse the assembly of the European utopia described by 
the parliamentarists. 
Evidence of resistance to change and symbolic attachment 
to presidentialism (propositions 4 and 5)
Certainly, many delegates expressed anxiety about adopting 
an institution virtually unknown in Brazil for much of 
the century. João Agripino’s on October 15 of 1987 
statement is representative: “[...] in my opinion, if we adopt 
40 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Paulo Marques on September 3, 1987.
41 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Leite Chaves on April 16, 1987.
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parliamentarism in this Constitution, we will be making 
a leap into darkness”. More than anything else, this 
sentiment came out in expressions of uncertainty about 
the foreign nature of parliamentarism. For example, “All 
told, I would have to say to your Excellency that, in truth, 
I do not share personally the idea that we ought to have 
presidentialism. I am a parliamentarist, but it happens that 
our culture will not absorb such”42. 
Analysis of roll call votes
The argumentation used in the delegates’ meetings tells 
part of the story. However, in the end, what mattered was 
their vote. Indeed, the votes – combined with what we know 
about the delegates – can be very enlightening. 
We have argued that institutional choice often refl ects 
a predisposition towards certain cultural and intellectual 
infl uences. The Brazilian case is characterized by a unique 
tension between an attraction to policies of the Americas 
and those of Europe. Consequently, it is true that there 
should be some variation among delegates to the Brazilian 
Constitutional Assembly in how sensitive they are to each 
of these infl uences. If we understand the background of 
the delegates, then we can make predictions about their 
relative susceptibility to the policies from either sphere 
of influence (that is, the United States or Europe). 
If the delegates respond the way we expect given their 
background, then we can claim even stronger evidence 
about the overall infl uence of cultural assimilation in the 
adoption of political practices. 
Accordingly, I have generated three hypotheses, each 
which makes a claim about a delegate’s predisposition 
towards an American or European product.
42 Excerpt from a speech delivered by Alexandre Puzyna on August 21, 1987.
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Hypothesis 1: Delegates with work or educational 
experience in Europe will favor parliamentarism; those 
with such experience in the United States will favor 
presidentialism. 
This hypothesis derives directly from theory reviewed 
earlier about the power of contact, communication, 
and cultural norms. In order to test the prediction, we 
have gathered information on both the educational 
and work experience abroad by each of the delegates. 
For educational experience abroad, we construct two 
variables, US Education and European Education, 
for which we code delegates 1 or 0 if they received a 
degree in the region of interest. For work experience, 
we have reviewed the professional profi les of delegates 
and coded, again for two variables, whether or not 
the delegate had worked in the United States or Europe. 
We expect experience in either area to predispose a 
delegate to the policy of that area. 
Hypothesis 2: Delegates from the south of Brazil will tend 
to favor parliamentarism. 
This expectation derives from Brazil’s highly diverse 
regional composition. Regions in Brazil are, in general, 
more delimited than in most countries economically, 
ethnically, socially, and politically. The Southern region 
of Brazil, a region including the states of Rio Grande do 
Sul, Paraná, and Santa Catarina, is largely populated by 
immigrants from Europe. Moreover, these areas maintain 
a strong attachment to Europe both emotionally and 
economically. Therefore, we expect that Europe will 
serve as a stronger reference group for delegates from 
the south than it would for delegates from other regions. 
Of course, these regions differ along important socio-
economic lines and it is essential to control for these 
differences in order to isolate any cultural effects (see 
our efforts to do this below).
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Hypothesis 3: Those in academic or law professions will 
favor parliamentarism; those in business professions 
will favor presidentialism.
This hypothesis derives from the conventional wisdom 
in Brazil (and much of Latin America) that business leaders 
are more highly connected and inspired by the United 
States, while lawyers and academics are similarly oriented 
towards Europe. A second, and intensifying, rationale for 
such a distinction stems from a diffusion thesis popularized 
by Powell and DiMaggio (1991). These authors argue 
that policy professionals and scholars will be more 
amenable to policy innovations which promise to be 
superior to existing policies. As we assert above, there was 
in Brazil at the time a rough consensus among intellectuals 
that parliamentarism was the superior institution. Our 
assumption is that academics and those in the law would be 
most susceptible to these opinions. 
Domestic political explanations of vote choice
Of course, the alternative to these diffusion explanations 
is that the system of government decision was one driven 
by domestic political concerns. In order to control for 
these factors, we include a number of political predictors 
in the model. A fi rst, most obvious, candidate is party 
affi liation. In the best of times, party loyalty in Brazil is 
notoriously weak (Mainwaring, 1995). Party loyalties during 
the Constitutional Assembly were particularly fragile as a 
multi-party system was in its infancy after thirty years of the 
two party system organized by the military government43. 
43 During the fi rst year of the assembly, the majority of delegates (55%) were 
organized into the catch-all PMDB – the legal opposition party during the military 
years. A number of smaller, further left, parties accounted for another 6 or 7% 
of the assembly that year. Towards the end of the Constitutional Assembly, a fair 
number of delegates had left the PMDB to join or form smaller parties, most 
notably the PSDB. The right, meanwhile, was concentrated in two parties, the PFL 
(23% of the assembly) and the PDS (7%).
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Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (1997), in an authoritative 
analysis of the more than 1 thousand roll call votes during 
the assembly, fi nd very little discipline with the exception 
of the smaller parties on the left. Nevertheless, given the 
importance of the system of government question during 
the assembly, it is reasonable to think that parties adopted 
offi cial positions on at least this issue. 
Furthermore, given the strong legacy of the 
authoritarian years, it is reasonable to expect that the 
loyalties defi ned by the previous two-party system would still 
be intact to some extent44. Accordingly, we include the party 
identifi cation of delegates during the authoritarian years, 
that is Arena (the military government party) and PMDB 
(the opposition). 
Including dummy variables for the parties assumes that 
delegates receive cues from the party leadership. However, 
the party identifi cations – which can be arrayed along an 
ideological scale – also help us identify the ideological 
leaning of the delegate. As I assert above, the system of 
government question does not seem to have an obvious 
ideological identity. However, it is reasonable to assume 
that, like any other issue, many delegates perceived the 
decision based on some calculation about where the two 
positions fall along a left-right scale. Consequently, we use 
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán’s adaptation of Maria Kinzo’s 
ideological scale to order the delegates (by virtue of their 
party identifi cation) along a left-right scale45.
As I describe above, one of the most important 
infl uences on the system of government vote was the arm 
twisting and vote-buying of President José Sarney. Without 
concrete information on phone calls from the presidential 
44 See Power (2000) in order to understand the vestigial pull of cleavages from the 
authoritarian era.
45 In future models, I hope to include a better predictor of ideology, calculated 
from the delegates’ votes on highly ideological issues in the assembly.
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palace and diversions of the federal budget, it is diffi cult 
to measure this crucial variable. Fortunately, one piece 
of information – the delegate’s average absentee rate – 
helps us measure Sarney’s infl uence. The key to Sarney’s 
lobbying success was to lure to Brasília those delegates 
who had otherwise not participated (either physically or 
intellectually) in the assembly. These were largely rightist 
members who, for whatever reason, participated only 
marginally in the constitutional process (Fleischer, 1990). 
Consequently, the absentee rate makes for a very rough 
approximation of Sarney’s infl uence. 
Bivariate results
Which, if any, of these variables mean anything to the 
vote on the system of government? Table 4 presents 
the vote results for several of these groups of delegates. 
A star indicates a rejection (at 5%) of the hypothesis 
that the vote count for a category is different from 
the vote count at large. The fi rst block of rows shows 
vote differences by party. As suspected, the largest party, the 
PMDB, is entirely undisciplined with half the party voting 
for parliamentarism and half for presidentialism. On 
the other hand, the smaller parties on the left, and even the 
rightist PFL to some extent, seem to have maintained a 
marginal party line. These party differences appear to be 
independent of ideology, albeit with a faint connection 
between rightist groups and presidentialism. The lack of 
both discipline and ideological coherence on this issue is 
evident if we array the party results along an ideological 
scale, like that suggested by Kinzo (1990). Parties on 
either end of the spectrum are more disciplined but 
entirely unpredictable by their position on the scale 
(Figure not included). 
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Table 4: 
Votes for Presidentialism by Category
Data Sources:  Ames and Power (1990); Reportorio Biográfi co (1988); 
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Presidentialism
All Delegates 558 61.8
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Ex-ARENA 213 76.5*











United States 110 71.8*
Latin America 99 61.2
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Public Service 13 61.5
Military 8 75.0
Other 18 50.0









State’s Income <60,000 167 71.1*
* Statistically different from the overall count (5%)
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As we suspected, the party lines from the military period 
are also meaningful. There is a twenty-point difference 
in the proportion voting for presidentialism between the 
groups divided along the party lines as they were drawn 
from 1964-1979.
The absentee rates, our measure of the carrot and 
stick efforts of President José Sarney, demonstrate 
some fairly dramatic differences. Those with higher 
absentee rates – that is, those who we presume to have 
been recruited by Sarney – voted overwhelmingly 
for presidentialism. This effect, of course, is also an 
indicator of our complementary theory that those absent for 
most of the assembly were deprived of the parliamentarist 
pitch that predominated the assembly. 
And what of our variables relating to the three diffu-
sion hypotheses described above? There we see mixed, but 
hypothesis-supporting, results. Two groups of delegates – 
those educated in Europe and those having missions to the 
US – demonstrate political predispositions based on 
their foreign experience. The European-educated voted 
for presidentialism at a comparably low 39% while those 
returning from missions to the US preferred presidentia-
lism at a rate 32 points higher (71%). On the other hand, 
education in the US and missions to Europe do not seem 
to make any difference. Nor does travel within the Latin 
American region. 
Prospects look good for Hypothesis 2 as well. Delegates 
from the south and north prefer parliamentarism and 
presidentialism, respectively, at remarkably higher 
numbers than do their colleagues from other regions. 
There is reason to think that some of this effect is due 
to correlated economic differences between the regions. 
A measure of economic development, per-capita income 
by state, suggests that representatives from poorer states 
prefer presidentialism to a greater extent than their 
293
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 88: 257-303, 2013
Zachary Elkins
colleagues. This difference, interestingly, parallels the 
choice of presidentialism by leaders of less developed 
states worldwide. Again, we can control for these wealth 
effects in a multivariate model.
Finally, consider the vote totals by profession. We see 
some encouraging results for Hypothesis 3 here. As predicted, 
business professionals tend to support presidentialism while 
law professionals support parliamentarism in greater numbers 
relative to their counterparts. Surprisingly, academics show 
no particular predilection for parliamentarism. I suspect 
part of this non-effect is the result of an overly inclusive 
categorization of academics which combines the scientists 
with the social scientists. 
Independent effects
Table 5 reports estimates of the change in the probability 
of voting presidentialist associated with a shift in each 
explanatory variable – most of which are dichotomous 
– from their minimum to their maximum values. These 
estimates are generated from a logistic regression 
of 15 selected variables from Table 4 on the vote for 
presidentialism46. The result is that most of the effects that 
we witnessed in the bivariate table discussed above remain 
after multiple regression. 
46 There are 555 valid votes and three abstentions. Missing data on some of the 
observations brings us down to a sample size of 533. The selected variables predict 
25% of the variance. Clearly then, we have omitted some predictors of vote choice, 
but those we have are meaningful enough. We employ the King, Tomz, Wittenberg 
program Clarify, to produce these estimates. The estimates from Clarify’s Monte 
Carlo simulation routine have the advantage of incorporating both fundamental 
uncertainty and estimation uncertainty
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Hypothesis 1 receives strong support. The effect of 
a European education and a foreign mission hold up 
in the context of controls. This is especially true of the 
European education, which seems to depress support for 
presidentialism by 36 percentage points! 
While we had expected multiple regression to deliver 
a knockout blow to Hypothesis 2, its fl agship variables – a 
dummy variable for the North and one for the South – remain 
standing with strong effects. Delegates from the South, 
Table 5: 
Independent Effect of Select Variables on the 
Probability of Voting for Presidentialism
Variable
Independent Effect on 
Probability of Voting for 
Presidentialism
95% Confi dence 
Interval
PFL Affi liation .31 .19     .40
PDT Affi liation .33 .19     .41
Ideology (left to right) ..03 -.11     .08
Ex-ARENA affi liation .20 .10     .29
Education in Europe -.36 -.54     -.13
Work in United States .13 .02     .24
Business Profession .04 -.09     .16
Law Profession -.08 -.19     -.01
South -.15 -.29     -.02
North .17 .04     .28
Income .07 -.08     .23
Absenteeism .44 .30     .57
N= 533
15 Explanatory variables (12 shown above)
Pseudo R-squared = .27
N.B. Estimates are the change in the probability of voting for presidentialism asso-
ciated with a shift in the explanatory variable from its minimum to its maximum, 
all other variables held at their means.  Calculated from logistic regression.
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the European-centric region, remain considerably less 
likely to vote presidentialist (a full 15 percentage points 
less likely). Those from North, comparably less European 
than the rest of the country (which serves as the reference 
group in the regression), are signifi cantly predisposed 
towards presidentialism. Crucially, the strength of these 
effects remains in the presence of other variables, most 
signifi cantly a measure of each delegate’s state’s wealth. 
There is moderate support for Hypothesis 3. 
Businessmen, who we expected to use the US as a model, 
are comparatively presidentialist but only marginally 
(4 percentage points). Lawyers, who are sympathetic to 
arguments for parliamentarism (for both European-centric 
and professional reasons), are comparatively parliamentarist 
but also marginally (8 percentage points). 
As for our controls, they largely remain moderate 
predictors of vote choice. Party affi liation matters a great 
deal for members of the PFL, PDT, and the PT. The Ex-Arena 
party faithful are indeed more likely to vote presidentialist 
(to the tune of 20 percentage points). The effect of our 
measure of ideology, however, seems to wash out, solidifying 
our impression of this issue as almost irrelevant to ideology.
The remarkably strong effect of absenteeism on the vote 
deserves emphasis. The delegate with the lowest attendance 
record was a full 44 percentage points more likely to 
vote for presidentialism than was the delegate with the best 
record. As we suggest above, there are two complementary 
interpretations of this effect. One is that President Sarney’s 
campaign directed largely at absent delegates was very 
effective. The second is the conclusion that those who 
had tuned into the deliberations and the pulse of the 
Constitutional Assembly had adopted the studied and learned 
view that parliamentarism was the superior institution. 
We illustrate the strength of these effects by creating 
some simulated probabilities for delegates of various 
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backgrounds (Table 6). Again, these are derived from the 
logistic regression estimates above. We simply fi x several 
variables at one value or another, keep the others at their 
means, and measure the model’s prediction. For example, 
the fi rst row simulates the probability of a presidential vote 
for a delegate with several parliamentarist tendencies – a 
lawyer from the South, educated in Europe, and with no 
previous affi liation with the military party Arena. Given 
these parameters the probability of a presidentialist vote is a 
trifl ing 0.11. Modifying the profi le in various ways produces 
another set of probabilities. A delegate from the North, 
involved in business, with trips to the United States, with a 
high absentee rate is almost certain to vote presidentialist 
(probability of 0.98). 
Table 6: 
Simulated Probabilities of Voting for 
Presidentialism for Exemplar Delegates
Profi le
Probability of Voting for 
Presidentialism
95% Confi dence 
Interval
Lawyer from Rio Grande do 
Sul.  Never in the ARENA.  
Educated in Europe.  
.11 .04     .30
Businessman from Acre, 
affi liated with ARENA, 
attended only 15 percent 
of the voting.  Has been on 
missions to the US.
.98 .86     .98
Doctor from Bahia.  PMDB.  
Educated in Europe.  Has 
not been to the US on a 
mission.
.32 .25     .41
Professor from Sao Paulo.  
PMDB with no ARENA 
experience.  Educated in the 
US, with missions to both 
the US and Europe.
.64 .53     .72
N.B.  Estimates calculated from logistic regression.  All other variables held at their 
means.
297
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 88: 257-303, 2013
Zachary Elkins
Interviews with delegates
Argumentation on the fl oor of the assembly and the vote 
behavior of the delegates provide indirect clues about how 
constitutional framers use foreign experience. However, 
the most direct method of understanding individuals’ 
motivations is to ask them. Accordingly, I conducted 
interviews with 79 of the 559 delegates to the constitutional 
convention as well as 68 bureaucrats who had been 
employed in the federal government during this period. 
My interview method included exploratory and 
confi rmatory elements. On the one hand, I treated the 
conversations as opportunities to ask open-ended questions 
which would elicit singular information about the delegates’ 
experience. So, for example, I asked respondents to 
describe the evolution of any bills or amendments on which 
they had worked, to describe the research process within 
their committees, and to identify attributes of foreign 
governments that they would like to reproduce in Brazil. 
On the other hand, I also asked respondents to answer a 
number of closed-ended questions with stipulated response 
choices. Since self-determination and innovation tend to 
be prized over emulation and conformity, the motives I 
sought to uncover, I included as many experimental and 
unobtrusive measures in the survey instrument as possible.
We concentrate here on the responses to interview 
questions with particularly interesting insights about 
propositions presented above. One component of the survey 
included several very general invitations for the respondent 
to discuss Brazilian institutions with respect to those 
worldwide. While these questions were intended as mere 
preliminaries, they yielded some interesting results. For 
example, consider the question, “what is one thing that 
is wrong with the Brazilian constitution that should be 
amended?”. Answers understandably ran the gamut from 
proposals to eliminate the constitution’s many social 
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protections to those to reinstate the monarchy. What is of 
interest to me was the high proportion of responses (48%) 
which either compared the Brazilian constitution with those 
of other nations, or justifi ed a change with an appeal to the 
practices of another nation. This offers strong support for 
the saliency of foreign examples.
Upon direct questioning, however, most respondents 
would dismiss or downplay the infl uence of foreign models 
on their own decision process. I expected that some of 
these responses were motivated by the socially desirable 
bias against emulation that I mention above. By the fi fth 
interview, I began to vary elements of a question which 
asked respondents to identify their motivations for their 
system of government vote. In the open-ended question, 
“How would you say that your choice of presidentialism/
parliamentarism was affected by your feelings towards the 
United States and Europe”, I substituted “your colleagues” 
for “your” for half of the respondents. While few would 
suggested that their own choice amounted to a choice 
between the institutions of the United States versus those of 
Europe, nearly half of those asked to speculate about their 
colleagues’ motivations suggested as much. 
Apart from the salience of foreign models, a far 
more basic issue concerns the level of information that 
decision makers possess of foreign institutions. Indeed, 
such knowledge is presumably a prerequisite for any 
actual emulation. To verify their knowledge, I asked the 
question, “Can you tell which countries you think of when 
you think of presidentialism? And when you think of 
parliamentarism?” The responses to the question testify to 
Brazilian political elites’ understanding of the international 
distribution of systems of government. All but one of the 79 
delegates named correctly at least two countries with either 
presidentialism or parliamentarism.
Finally, consider responses to the question, “Many times 
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it is useful for governments to learn from the policies of 
other governments. Which policies would you say are more 
relevant to Brazil, those of the United States or those of 
Europe?” Table 7 sorts the responses by several categories, 
including choice of institution and region. The results here 
support the conclusions from the roll-call analysis that a 
predilection for the policies and institutions of either the 
United States or Europe infl uenced the choice of system 
of government. Of those who voted for presidentialism, 
56% suggested that the United States was more relevant 
compared with only 26% of parliamentarists. The responses 
by region, similarly, lend some credibility to the hypothesis 
advanced in the roll-call analysis that a delegates’ region 
leads to a preference for either United States or European 
products. Those from the South are more likely to fi nd 
European models more relevant (76%) than are those from 
the North (60%). 
Table 7: 
Whose models are more relevant to policy 
makers, the United States or Europe?
Universe:  Delegates to the 1987-1988 Constitutional Assembly and 
those employed by the federal government during 1987-1988.
“Many times it is useful for governments to learn from the policies of 
other governments.  Which policies would you say are more relevant 
to Brazil, those of the United States or those of Europe?”
United States Europe Neither Total
Bureaucrats 23 (34%) 43 (63%) 1 (1%) 68 (100%)
Constitutional Delegates
Those voting for 
presidentialism
19 (53%) 17 (47%) 0 (0%) 36 (100%)
Those voting for 
parliamentarism
11 (26%) 31 (72%) 1 (2%) 43 (100%)
Region
South 4 (17%) 18 (78%) 1 (4%) 23 (100%)
Other 49 (40%) 74 (60%) 1 (1%) 124 (100%)
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* * *
What have we learned? First, leaders are very attentive 
to foreign experience and foreign models when designing 
political institutions. Not only are their constitutional 
proposals largely inspired by foreign models, but these 
models serve as a large part of delegates’ justifi cation for their 
position. This is despite some understandable resistance to 
the wholesale importation of a foreign policy, as well as a 
wealth of relevant domestic experience to draw on. Second, 
there is strong evidence that constitutional designers are 
highly sensitive to the infl uence of cultural and, to a lesser 
extent, geographic, peers. Third, it appears true that the 
institutions and policies of economically and politically high-
achieving nations tend to be especially attractive models, 
with the caveat that that of the United States elicits some 
resentment. Finally, it is clear that political institutions show 
some of the same evolutionary ineffi ciencies that we see in 
market examples typifi ed by the prevalence of the QWERTY 
typewriter. Namely, when institutions become the industry 
standard within certain peer groups, modifying or removing 
them is exceedingly diffi cult. 
There are certainly other interesting avenues to pursue 
within these themes. For example, the tension in the 
Americas between the attraction to the United States and 
Europe intriguing. Historically, the United States served 
as a compelling, young, irreverent, and vibrant model for 
democracies evolving in the 1800’s. Today, likely because 
of the substitution of the United States for Europe as the 
“imperial” power as well as an increasingly poor fi t between 
the United States political structure and that of Latin 
America, the European model appears more relevant. This 
role reversal is worthy of more attention. 
What are the implications of this study? There is reason 
to believe the diffusion properties we describe in the Brazilian 
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case are generalizable to other cases – to both other countries 
and other policies. In fact, it is quite possible that diffusion 
effects will be even more intense in other settings. Other 
policies, not as symbolic or basic as the system of government, 
will likely be more amenable to change (and so, more 
sensitive to external infl uence). Similarly, other countries 
less confl icted in their cultural and political identities (for 
example, those closer to either the United States or Europe 
like Central America and Eastern Europe, respectively) may 
demonstrate even stronger imitation effects. 
Zachary Elkins 
é professor associado do departamento de governo da Uni-
versidade do Texas.
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